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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you go to a nearby electronics store to buy a
DVD player. At the store you find two very similar DVD
players that meet your needs. One costs $69.99; the other
costs $79.99 but offers a $20 mail-in rebate. Which one will
you choose?
If you are like most people, you will buy the $79.99 DVD
player because when you compute its post-rebate price, it will
seem like the better value. However, that DVD player is a
better value only if you later take the steps necessary to
redeem the mail-in rebate. Unfortunately, you will probably
never redeem the rebate because you will either forget about
it, procrastinate until the deadline has passed, lose the
receipt or UPC code, or later decide that the $20 rebate is not
worth the redemption effort. Indeed, almost 80% of rebate
dollars go unclaimed, and the high percentage of unredeemed
rebates appears to be a major reason for rebates’ use. 1 As one
retailer explained to The New York Times, “[m]anufacturers
love rebates . . . [t]hey get people into stores, but when it
comes time to collect, few people follow through. And this is
just what the manufacturer has in mind.”2
Lawmakers and legal scholars have proposed various
ways to protect consumers from their failure to redeem
rebates. These proposals vary dramatically in the degree to
which they restrict consumer choice. At the most restrictive
end of the spectrum, lawmakers in several states have
proposed legislation that would ban mail-in rebate offers
altogether. 3 This solution, however, would harm savvy

1. PROMOTION MARKETING ASSOCIATION, PMA MAIL-IN REBATE
BENCHMARKING
STUDY
(May
1,
2005),
https://pmalink.siteym.com/resource/resmgr/research_open/pmamailinrebate.htm
[hereinafter
REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY].
2. Catherine Greenman, The Trouble With Rebates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1999, at G1. See also Tim Silk & Chris Janiszewski, Managing Mail-in Rebate
Promotions 8–9 (undated) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://warrington.ufl.edu/mkt/docs/janiszewski/Rebate.pdf
(“Successful rebate promotions are also designed to limit the number of rebatedependent purchasers that attempt to redeem a rebate offer.”).
3. Cornelia Pechmann & Tim Silk, Policy and Research Related to
Consumer Rebates: A Comprehensive Review, 32 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING
255, 256 (2013).
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consumers who save money on their purchases by redeeming
rebates. Several prominent legal scholars have argued that
less restrictive, disclosure-based regulations could improve
rebate-related purchase decisions without restricting
consumer choice. Specifically, they propose requiring rebate
offers to disclose the actual rebate redemption rates. 4
This proposal is just one example of the recent surge of
interest in non-restrictive regulatory interventions that
“nudge” people toward desired behaviors without foreclosing
other choices. 5 In fact, the Obama administration recently
proposed a Social and Behavioral Science Team to help
identify such interventions. 6 Non-restrictive regulations are
attractive to lawmakers and academics because they interfere
less with free-market principles than do other regulatory
approaches and better preserve consumer autonomy. 7
In addition to preserving consumer choice, redemption
rate disclosures are an intuitively appealing solution to the
widespread problem of consumers failing to redeem rebates.
When faced with strong evidence of others’ redemption
failures, consumers should realize that they themselves are
also unlikely to redeem rebates. However, some scholars have
expressed skepticism about the likely effectiveness of such
disclosures, 8 and there are no existing studies on the
effectiveness of mandatory redemption rate disclosures.
Our Article is the first to provide evidence on this issue.
4. Ian Ayres, Did you use that gift card or rebate?, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 9,
2007),
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/did-you-use-gift-card-orrebate (“If sellers disclosed [mail-in rebate] redemption rates, then consumers
could decide whether it’s worth the risk.”); Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari,
Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3 ERASMUS L. REV. 93, 109 (2010). See
also Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of
Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1703 (2006), (“If, for
example, consumers understood that they were not likely to obtain rebates, they
would not take rebate offers into account in deciding whether to buy
products . . . policymakers might require rebate offers to disclose that few
consumers redeem similar rebates.”).
5. For example, the book Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health,
Wealth, and Happiness, which called for adoption of non-restrictive regulatory
approaches was recently a New York Times bestseller. RICHARD H. THALER &
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH,
AND HAPPINESS (2008).
6. Katrin Bennhold, The Ministry of Nudges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2013, at
BU 1.
7. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not
an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003).
8. John G. Lynch Jr. & Gal Zauberman, When Do You Want It? Time,
Decisions, and Public Policy, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 67, 71–72 (2006).
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Previous research on warnings and disclaimers in other
domains shows that their effects are context-specific and
difficult to predict. 9 Specifically, some disclosures, such as
on-product safety warnings, can be effective. 10 However,
other warning disclosures are ineffective 11 or, even worse,
boomerang and increase the undesirable behaviors they are
meant to prevent. 12 Uncertainty regarding the effects of
rebate disclosures means that this issue is ripe for empirical
examination.
This Article presents the results of our experiment that
investigates whether legally mandated disclosures decrease
consumers’ optimism about redeeming mail-in rebates and
their willingness to purchase rebated products.
The
experiment examines the effects of two different rebate
disclosures on 549 U.S. consumers. One disclosure directly
tests whether consumers who are made aware of low rebate
redemption rates are less likely to purchase rebated products.
This disclosure (the “Redemption Rate Disclosure”) states
that “sales records show rebate redemption rates of
approximately 30% for rebates of this type and size.” The
other disclosure attempts to temper consumers’ optimism
about rebate redemption by explicitly warning them about
overoptimism and the reasons for it.
Specifically, this
“Overoptimism Disclosure” states that “[s]tudies show that
people often overestimate the probability that they will redeem
a mail-in rebate because they fail to anticipate that they will
forget, procrastinate, lose the necessary materials, or later
decide it is not worth the effort.”
The experiment’s results indicate that neither the

9. David W. Stewart & Ingrid M. Martin, Intended and Unintended
Consequences of Warning Messages: A Review and Synthesis of Empirical
Research, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 1, 1–2 (1994).
10. Eli P. Cox III, Michael S. Wogalter, Sara L. Stokes, & Elizabeth J.
Tipton Murff, Do Product Warnings Increase Safe Behavior? A Meta-Analysis,
16 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 195, 201 (1997).
11. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665–79 (2011); Kesten C. Green & J. Scott
Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclaimers in Advertising, 31
J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 293, 302 (2012); Molly Mercer, Alan R. Palmiter, &
Ahmed E. Taha, Worthless Warnings? Testing the Effectiveness of Disclaimers in
Mutual Fund Advertisements, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 429, 429 (2010).
12. Debra Jones Ringold, Boomerang Effect: In Response to Public
Interventions: Some Unintended Consequences in the Alcoholic Beverage Market,
25 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 27, 51–52 (2002); Stewart & Martin, supra note 9, at 12–
13.
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Redemption Rate Disclosure nor the Overoptimism Disclosure
reduces consumers’ willingness to purchase rebated products.
Instead, the disclosures appear to backfire, increasing
willingness to purchase rebated products.
Additional
analyses show similar effects on consumers’ optimism about
rebate redemption. Neither disclosure reduces consumers’
optimism about the probability that they will redeem the
rebate, and, in fact, the Redemption Rate Disclosure
significantly increases this optimism. Overall, our results
indicate that not only is a disclosure-based regulatory
approach unlikely to improve consumers’ rebate-related
purchase decisions, it will likely harm consumers by making
them even more optimistic about redemption, causing them to
make poorer purchase decisions.
In addition to the obvious practical significance of these
results for the debate over how to improve consumers’ rebaterelated purchase decisions, our results sound a broader
warning to lawmakers who have proposed other nonrestrictive regulations.
Many lawmakers favor nonrestrictive regulations such as mandatory disclosures because
they believe that, even if mandatory disclosures do not help
all consumers, such disclosures do no harm because
consumers are free to ignore them. 13 Our experiment shows
that this belief is incorrect: mandatory disclosures—even
those with strong intuitive support—can harm the very
people they are intended to help.
Our experimental results also speak to the likely
effectiveness of other proposed disclosures that attempt to
improve people’s choices by informing them about average
outcomes or behaviors. For example, scholars have proposed
mandatory disclosures informing people buying gym
memberships about average gym attendance statistics,
because people buying gym memberships often vastly
overestimate how often they will go to the gym. 14 In our
study, neither warning people about low rebate redemption
rates nor warning them about consumers’ general tendency to
be overly optimistic reduced their optimism about their own
future rebate redemption. The disclosures appear to fail
because they inform people about average consumer behavior,
and most people believe they are better than average. In
13. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 11, at 682.
14. Bar-Gill & Ferrari, supra note 4, at 106–07 (2010).
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other words, people are overly optimistic about whether they
are overly optimistic. Given that consumers reason this way,
our results suggest that disclosures informing people about
average behaviors might be similarly ineffective (or even
harmful) in other contexts such as gym memberships.
The remainder of this Article more thoroughly develops
these ideas. Part I discusses why firms offer mail-in rebates
and why consumers fail to redeem them. Part II presents
possible regulatory approaches to reduce the number of
consumers who fail to redeem rebates. Part III reports the
results of our experiment, and Part IV discusses these results
and their implications for regulating mail-in rebate offers and
for consumer disclosures in general.
I.

BACKGROUND & THEORY

A. Why Do Companies Offer Mail-In Rebates?
A mail-in rebate is a promotion in which a manufacturer
or retailer refunds a portion of a product’s purchase price to
consumers who purchase the product and later submit
documentation regarding the purchase. 15 Redeeming a rebate
typically requires the consumer to mail materials such as a
completed rebate form, the product’s UPC code, and the sales
receipt to the rebate offeror or a rebate fulfillment center. 16
After the material is processed, a rebate check is sent to the
consumer. 17 For purposes of this Article, “mail-in rebates”
also encompass rebate programs in which consumers can
submit the required material via the internet rather than by
mail, and those in which consumers receive something other
than cash (e.g., a gift certificate) for redeeming the rebate.
So-called “instant rebates” differ from mail-in rebates because
instant rebates are discounts given at the time of purchase,

15. Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of
Consumer Rebates, 12(2) STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 366 (2007) (defining a
consumer rebate as a “delayed incentive offered by either a product
manufacturer or retailer that requires consumers to: (1) make a purchase at a
pre-rebate shelf price; (2) submit a request for a refund amount by mail or the
Internet to the rebate offeror, or a fulfillment center that processes rebates for
the rebate offeror; and (3) wait some period of time after the purchase and
rebate submission for the rebate offeror or its agent to send a rebate check or
something of value . . . to the consumer.”).
16. Sandra Block, Rattled about rebate hassles? Regulators starting to step
in, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 2005, at B3.
17. Edwards, supra note 15, at 366.
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rather than at a later date, and typically do not require
redemption effort by the consumer. 18 Thus, an instant rebate
is structurally more similar to a sale than to a mail-in rebate.
Mail-in rebates are a popular promotional tool, although
estimates of their use vary. In 2004, Promotion Marketing
Association (“PMA”) members estimated that consumers
redeemed mail-in rebates totaling $487 million. 19 A rebate
consultant provides a higher estimate, stating that about 400
million rebate checks worth $6 billion are mailed annually. 20
Rebates are especially common on certain types of consumer
goods, such as electronics and computer-related products. 21
Mail-in rebates are popular for several reasons. First,
unlike coupons or sales, rebates allow the manufacturer or
retailer to collect consumer information, such as names and
addresses, which facilitates future marketing to those
consumers. 22 Second, a rebate does not require lowering the
product’s nominal purchase price. Thus, a rebate is less
likely than a sale to create consumer resistance to the regular
price when the promotion ends. 23 Third, and perhaps most
important, many rebate-induced purchasers later fail to
redeem their rebates. Promotion managers report rebate
redemption rates of about 40% on consumer electronics,
redemption rates of between 10% and 30% for $10–$20
rebates on $100 software, and “very low” redemption rates on
rebates under $10. 24 A study by the PMA found an overall
18. Damon Darlin, Rebates On the Way to Expiring, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2006, at C1.
19. REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1.
20. Betsy Spethmann, The Real Problem with Rebates, CHIEF MARKETER,
(Jan. 11, 2006), http://chiefmarketer.com/othertactics/rebate_problems_011106.
21. Brian
Grow,
The
Great
Rebate
Runaround,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, (Dec. 5, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/conten
t/05_49/b3962074.htm.
22. Edwards, supra note 15, at 372.
23. Id. See also Valerie Folkes and Rita D. Wheat, Consumers’ Price
Perceptions of Promoted Products, 71 J. RETAILING 317, 326 (1995); Grow,
supra note 21 (noting that consumer-product companies “pioneered rebates in
the 1970s as a nifty way to advertise small discounts without actually marking
the products down.”).
24. Silk & Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 5. See also Johny Johansson, IN
YOUR FACE: HOW AMERICAN MARKETING EXCESS FUELS ANTI-AMERICANISM 52
(2004) (“Redemption rates vary, but are generally low—less than 50% for bigticket technology goods, and as low as 2% for packaged goods.”). Exact
redemption rates are difficult to find because companies are reluctant to share
redemption data. For example, in a survey of rebate fulfillment center
managers, 80% of the managers reported believing they would benefit from
additional research on rebates, yet only 17% said they would be willing to
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average redemption rate of only 21%, as a percentage of total
dollar sales. 25 In other words, consumers do not collect about
four-fifths of the mail-in rebate dollars to which they are
entitled.
Not all failures to redeem rebates should concern
policymakers. Undoubtedly, some consumers buy rebated
products not intending to redeem the rebates.
These
“intended non-redeemers” likely disregard rebate offers when
making their purchase decisions. 26 Thus, rebate offers, like
coupons, can be a form of price discrimination. A rebate offer,
in effect, allows two different prices to be charged to
consumers: an after-rebate price to consumers who redeem
the rebate and a pre-rebate price to consumers who do not
This price discrimination can be
redeem the rebate. 27
efficient if more of the product is sold than would be if all
consumers had to pay the same price. 28
However, rebate offers harm consumers who purchase a
product because of the rebate but later fail to redeem it. This
phenomenon is commonly referred to as “breakage” or
As noted above, the PMA estimated that
“slippage.” 29
approximately four-fifths of rebate dollars are not redeemed.
It is unclear exactly how many non-redemptions stem from
rebate-induced purchases, but the number is likely large.
The PMA argues for using redemptions as a percentage of
incremental sales (i.e., sales induced by the rebate offer) as a
measure of the efficacy of a rebate offer. 30 A PMA survey
found this percentage to be 68%, suggesting that
approximately a third of rebates from rebate-induced
supply data on their past rebate promotions for an academic study. Silk &
Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 24–25, tbl.1.
25. REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1.
26. Timothy G. Silk, Examining Purchase and Non-redemption of Mail-in
Rebates: The Impact of Offer Variables on Consumers’ Subjective and Objective
Probability of Redeeming 5 (May 2004) (unpublished PhD dissertation,
University of Florida), http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0004380/silk_t.pdf).
27. Yuxin Chen, Sridhar Moorthy & Z. John Zhang, Price Discrimination
After the Purchase: Rebates as State-Dependent Discounts, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1131,
1131 (2005).
28. Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against Consumer
Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 586–87 (2006).
This argument assumes that consumers who are more price sensitive are more
likely to redeem rebates. However, survey evidence suggests that this might
not be the case. Rebates: Get What You Deserve, CONSUMER REP., Sept. 2009, at
7.
29. Chen, Moorthy & Zhang, supra note 27, at 1131.
30. REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1.
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purchases are not redeemed. 31 This calculation, however,
likely overstates the redemption rate on rebate-induced
purchases, because it assumes that all redemptions come
In reality, some
from rebate-induced purchases. 32
redemptions are by “opportunistic redeemers”—consumers
who would have purchased the product even in the absence of
the rebate. 33 Thus, the true redemption rate on rebateinduced purchases is almost certainly lower than the twothirds suggested by the PMA. Consistent with this, rebate
fulfillment center managers estimate that more than half of
non-redeemed rebates are attributable to consumers who
intended to redeem the rebate. 34
In summary, many consumers who are induced to
purchase products by mail-in rebate offers later fail to redeem
those rebates. We next discuss why this occurs.
B. Why Do Consumers Fail to Redeem Rebates?
There are many reasons why consumers who make
rebate-induced purchases fail to follow through on their
redemption plans: they change their minds about whether
the rebate reward is worth the redemption effort,
procrastinate, forget about the rebate until the redemption
deadline passes, or lose required redemption materials.
1. Consumers Change Their Minds Regarding Whether
to Redeem Rebates
Mail-in rebates require consumers to make decisions at
two points in time. Consumers must first decide whether to
purchase the rebated product. Then, if they buy the product,
they must later decide whether to redeem the rebate. This
time separation causes some consumers who buy a product
intending to redeem the rebate to later change their minds
and decide that the rebate award is not worth the redemption
effort. This likely occurs because, at the time of purchase,
consumers overestimate the future utility from the rebate
award and underestimate the future disutility from the
31. Id.
32. Firms cannot calculate the true redemption rate on incremental sales
because they cannot tell whether a redemption was from someone who would
have purchased the product even in the absence of a rebate. Silk &
Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 7.
33. Silk, supra note 26, at 5.
34. Silk & Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 9, 25 tbl.1.
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redemption effort.
Overestimating the Future Utility from Rebate Awards.
There are two possible reasons that consumers anticipate
more utility from a rebate award at the time of purchase than
they do at the time of the redemption decision. First, the
time delay increases the likelihood that consumers will
decouple the product price and the rebate amount. According
to prospect theory, people value outcomes based on whether
they represent gains or losses from a reference point, 35 and
the amount of utility people experience from a gain is lower
than the amount of disutility they experience from an equalsized loss. 36 At the time of purchase, most consumers likely
aggregate the loss from the product price and the gain from
the rebate award. Consider a product with a $10 price and a
$3 rebate. If consumers net the $10 loss and the $3 gain at
the time of purchase, the rebate will be viewed as a reduction
in the loss from buying the product. 37 When consumers make
redemption decisions, however, enough time has passed that
they often are no longer thinking about the product price.
Thus, at that time, consumers view the rebate as a gain of $3
rather than a $3 reduction of a loss. 38 Because losses are
more painful than gains are pleasurable, consumers will
value the rebate award more at the time of purchase (when it
reduces a loss) than at the time they make the redemption
decision (when it creates a gain). 39
Two prior studies support the idea that a rebate’s
monetary amount receives more weight in consumers’
purchase decisions than in their redemption decisions. In one
experiment, participants completed a survey regarding their
movie preferences. 40 They were told that in gratitude for
completing the survey, a movie studio would sell them two
discounted movie tickets.
Participants could choose to
purchase the two tickets for a total of $11 or to purchase the
two tickets for $13 with the right to receive a mail-in rebate.
35. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979).
36. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1039 (1991).
37. Sovern, supra note 4, at 1656.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Tim Silk, Getting Started is Half the Battle: The Influence of Deadlines
and Consumer Effort on Rebate Redemption 13–14 (undated) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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The amount of the rebate varied; some participants were
offered a $6 rebate and others were offered a $9 rebate. 41 The
experiment found that participants were more likely to choose
the rebated tickets when the rebate was $9 than when it was
$6. 42 However, the size of the rebate did not affect the
likelihood that participants subsequently applied to redeem
the rebate. 43
Another experimental study reported similar findings in
a different setting. In that study, participants completed a
short survey in return for a dollar. 44 At the end of the survey,
they were told that instead of receiving the dollar, they could
complete and mail in a second survey to receive higher
compensation (either $2 or $4). 45 Participants offered $4 were
much more likely than those offered $2 to forego the initial
dollar and take the second survey, but were not significantly
more likely to mail in the second survey. 46
A second reason that consumers anticipate more utility
from rebate awards at the time of purchase also stems from
the decoupling of the rebate award and the purchase price
that occurs over time. At purchase, consumers’ expected
utility from the rebate award is likely a function of both the
absolute size of the award and its size relative to the
product’s price. As time passes, however, consumers are
more likely to frame the award solely in absolute terms.
Consider again a product with a $10 price and a $3 rebate.
At the time of purchase, consumers experience utility related
to the reward both in absolute terms (“this rebate saves me
$3”) and in relative terms (“this rebate saves me almost a
third of the purchase price”). However, when consumers later
decide whether to redeem the rebate, they are no longer
thinking about the product’s price. They therefore anticipate
utility solely based on the award’s absolute magnitude. In
other words, at redemption, the rebate is viewed as merely $3
rather than also as an impressive 30% of the purchase price. 47
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 18–19.
44. Dilip Soman, The Illusion of Delayed Incentives: Evaluating Future
Effort—Money Transactions, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 427, 436 (1998).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 430–31.
47. Soman, supra note 44, at 436. (“[T]he face value of an incentive may
appear large when framed against the cost of the product (e.g., prior to choice)
but insignificantly small after the purchase. This differential framing of the

416

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

In support of this idea, a study by the PMA found that
“[i]ncremental sales gains [from a rebate] are influenced more
by the size of the rebate relative to the list price [of the
product] than by the absolute size of the rebate. Redemption
rates are influenced more by the absolute size of the rebate
than by the size of the rebate relative to the list price.” 48
Taken together, the prior literature suggests that one
reason consumers fail to redeem mail-in rebates is that they
anticipate more utility from a rebate award at the time of
purchase than they do when later deciding whether to redeem
the rebate.
Underestimating the Future Disutility of Redemption
Effort.
Consumers also change their minds regarding
whether to redeem rebates because they underestimate the
future disutility associated with the redemption tasks.
Again, this underestimation appears to stem from the delay
between the product purchase decision and the rebate
redemption decision. Research shows that at the time of
purchase, people overestimate the time they will have
available for future redemption tasks. 49 Further, people tend
to underestimate the length and unpleasantness of future
tasks. 50 Thus, when deciding whether to purchase a rebated
product, consumers likely underestimate the length and
unpleasantness of the future tasks required to redeem the
rebate (e.g., cutting out the UPC code, filling out the rebate
form, and addressing and mailing the envelope) and
overestimate the time they will have available for completing
these tasks.
Consumers underestimate the unpleasantness of future
redemption effort at least partly because they tend to think
abstractly about future tasks. 51 Temporal construal theory
suggests that activities that are temporally distant are

face value could widen the discrepancy between choice and redemption rates.”).
48. REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1.
49. Gal Zauberman & John G. Lynch, Jr., Resource Slack and Propensity to
Discount Delayed Investments of Time Versus Money, 134(1) J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: GEN. 23, 30–31 (2005).
50. Robert A. Josephs & Eugene Hahn, Bias and Accuracy in Estimates of
Task Duration, 61 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 202, 202 (1995);
George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 281–82 (1996). See also Soman,
supra note 44, at 429 (“there is broad consensus [in the behavioral decision
theory literature] that the pain of future effort is underestimated.”).
51. Edwards, supra note 15, at 362, 394–95.
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perceived as more abstract, while activities that are
temporally close are perceived as more concrete. 52 When
consumers purchase a rebated product, rebate redemption
effort is in the future, so consumers represent this effort as an
abstract, high-level construal (i.e., they think about this effort
only in broad, general terms). At the time of the redemption
decision, however, consumers represent the effort as a
concrete, low-level construal (i.e., they think of the specific
tasks they will need to perform to redeem the rebate). When
consumers think of the effort in more concrete terms, the
effort looms larger than it did at the time of purchase. 53
Prior experimental evidence supports the idea that
consumers underestimate the disutility of future redemption
effort and, as a result, later fail to redeem rebates that they
had anticipated redeeming. In one experiment, participants
chose between purchasing two similar products. 54 One of the
products did not offer a rebate. The other product had a
higher base price but offered a rebate that, if redeemed, made
it the less expensive product. Before making their choice,
participants were told that they would need to drive to a
nearby store to collect the rebate. 55 The experiment varied
the time between the product purchase and the required
rebate redemption effort (i.e., people had to drive to the store
the same weekend as the experiment or in 2–4 weeks) and
varied the amount of effort required to redeem the rebate
(i.e., either a 20-mile or 10-mile drive to the store). 56 When
the redemption effort had to be expended the same weekend
as the purchase, the amount of redemption effort (i.e., 20versus 10-mile drive) affected participants’ willingness to
choose the rebated product. 57 However, if there was a
substantial delay before the redemption effort had to be
expended, then the distance to the store did not affect
participants’ product choices. 58
Another experiment in a different context confirms that
consumers underestimate the future disutility of redemption
52. Yaacov Trope and Nira Liverman, Temporal Construal and TimeDependent Changes in Preference, 79(6) J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876,
877–78 (2000).
53. Soman, supra note 44, at 429.
54. Id. at 432–33.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 433.
57. Id. at 433–34.
58. Id.
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effort. 59 As discussed above, in that experiment, participants
completed a short survey for a dollar. After completing the
questionnaire, participants could choose to forego the dollar
and receive greater compensation in exchange for completing
and returning a longer questionnaire in a few weeks. 60 The
experiment varied the length of the second questionnaire (i.e.,
the effort required to collect the greater compensation). 61 The
second questionnaire’s length did not affect participants’
willingness to give up the dollar for the second
questionnaire, 62 but it had a large effect on whether people
later completed the second questionnaire. 63
In summary, some consumers fail to redeem rebates
because they change their minds regarding whether the
rebate award is worth the redemption effort. This occurs
because they anticipate more utility from the rebate award
and less disutility from the redemption effort when making
purchase decisions than they do when making redemption
decisions. 64
2. Consumers Procrastinate, Forget About the Rebate, or
Lose Redemption Materials
Although some rebates are not redeemed because
consumers change their minds, others are not redeemed
because consumers procrastinate, forget about the rebate, or
lose required redemption materials. The time delay between
the product purchase and rebate redemption is responsible
for these phenomena as well.
Akerlof attributes
procrastination to temporal differences in the salience of
costs. 65 Because the effort (i.e., cost) of completing a task in
the present is more salient than the cost of completing it in
the future, people postpone the task until a future day
59. Id. at 430.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 430.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 430–31 & fig.1.
64. Further evidence of this comes from the movie ticket experiment
discussed above. Silk, supra note 40. Of participants who chose the rebated
ticket offer yet later failed to redeem it, 8.3% stated that they failed to redeem
the rebate because they “decided the money saved was not worth the effort
required,” and another 12.5% stated that they started the redemption process
but gave up because “it was too much work.” Id. at 60 tbl.2.
65. George A. Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1,
3–4 (1991).
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without foreseeing that, when that future day arrives, they
will postpone the task again for the same reason. Because
rebate redemption effort occurs after the product purchase,
mail-in rebates automatically start consumers down this
procrastination road. 66
The delay between product purchase and rebate
redemption also causes some consumers to forget to redeem
the rebate. Research has shown that “[d]elays or intervening
activities that separate formation of an intention and the
opportunity to act on the intention are likely to foster
forgetting.” 67 Procrastination and forgetting are intertwined;
the longer consumers procrastinate, the more likely they are
to forget to redeem the rebate.
In the movie ticket
experiment, about half of participants who said they forgot to
redeem the rebate stated that they had procrastinated before
In addition, the longer that
eventually forgetting. 68
consumers procrastinate, the longer they have to misplace or
accidently dispose of necessary rebate redemption materials,
such as their receipt or UPC code.
C. Why Don’t Consumers Anticipate that They Will Fail to
Redeem Rebates?
Procrastinating,
forgetting,
losing
things,
and
misestimating utility from future rewards and effort are not
unique to mail-in rebates—people experience them in other
parts of their lives as well. Given that people fall prey to
these phenomena frequently and thus often experience the
resulting negative consequences, why do they not learn from
their past behaviors?
The optimism bias provides a simple and powerful
explanation for consumers’ failure to anticipate that they will
fail to redeem a rebate. People are overoptimistic in a wide
variety of contexts, from underestimating the probability of
getting fired or divorced to overestimating the probability of
outliving one’s peers. 69 Overoptimism appears to persist even
66. Indeed, 47% percent of the participants in the movie ticket experiment
who failed to redeem the rebate stated that they had procrastinated until the
deadline for redeeming the rebate had passed. Silk, supra note 40, 60 tbl.2.
67. Silk & Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 17.
68. Id. In total, 13% of the movie ticket experiment participants who failed
to redeem the rebate stated that they forgot to do so. Silk, supra note 40, at 60
tbl.2.
69. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 810 tbl.1 (1980). See also Manju Puri &
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after past failures. 70
In some contexts, being overly optimistic is beneficial.
Optimism creates the illusion that people have more control
over outcomes than they actually do, which gives them
confidence they can achieve their goals. 71 Studies have found,
for example, that optimistic people are more likely to eat
healthy food, exercise, and save for the future. 72
In other contexts, however, overoptimism leads to
A recent experiment provides
negative consequences. 73
evidence of the negative consequences of overoptimism
regarding rebate redemption. In that study, consumers chose
between a rebated product and a non-rebated product in a
context where those who failed to redeem the rebate would
have saved money by choosing the non-rebated product. 74
Participants who chose the rebated product estimated a 94%
probability that they would redeem the rebate, but only 69%
actually redeemed it. 75
Another recent paper offers an explanation for
consumers’ overoptimism about future rebate redemption. In
that study, consumers were asked either to list reasons they
might or might not redeem a rebate on a desired product. 76
Listing reasons for successful redemption did not affect
consumers’ beliefs about the likelihood they would redeem the
rebate. 77 In contrast, consumers who were told to list reasons
why they might not redeem the rebate estimated a
David T. Robinson, Optimism and Economic Choice, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 79
(2007).
70. Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin & Michael Ross, Exploring the “Planning
Fallacy”: Why People Underestimate Their Task Completion Times, 67(3) J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 366, 379 (1994); Cade Massey, Joseph P.
Simmons & David A. Armor, Hope Over Experience: Desirability and the
Persistence of Optimism, 22(2) PSYCHOL. SCI. 274, 277 (2011).
71. Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-being: A
Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULLETIN 193, 199 (1988).
72. Charles S. Carver, Michael F. Scheier & Suzanne C. Segerstrom,
Optimism, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 879, 883–85 (2010). See also Puri &
Robinson, supra note 69, at 89.
73. See, e.g., Amanda J. Dillard, Amanda M. Midboe & William M. P. Klein,
The Dark Side of Optimism: Unrealistic Optimism about Problems with Alcohol
Predicts Subsequent Negative Event Experiences, 35 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1540, 1547 (2009).
74. Silk, supra note 40, at 23–25.
75. Id. at 25.
76. John T. Gourville & Dilip Soman, The Consumer Psychology of Mail-in
Rebates, 20 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 147, 149 (2011).
77. Id.
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significantly lower likelihood of rebate redemption. 78 These
results suggest that when consumers wish to purchase a
rebated product, they naturally generate scenarios in their
minds in which they will redeem the rebate, rather than
These positive
scenarios in which they won’t do so. 79
scenarios, in turn, lead to overoptimism about the likelihood
of redeeming.
In summary, consumers appear to be overly optimistic
about the likelihood they will redeem rebates.
This
overoptimism, which appears to be the result of consumers’
tendency to focus too much on positive redemption scenarios,
harms consumers by causing poor purchase decisions. These
prior studies suggest one possible way to improve rebaterelated purchase decisions might be to provide disclosures
that reduce consumers’ overoptimism by informing them
about this general tendency toward overoptimism. In the
following section, we discuss this type of disclosure-based
solution, as well as other possible regulatory approaches to
reducing the number of rebate-induced purchasers who
subsequently fail to redeem their rebates.
II.

POSSIBLE REGULATORY SOLUTIONS

Several types of regulatory actions have been proposed to
reduce the number of rebate-induced purchasers who fail to
redeem their rebates (i.e., breakage).
These potential
solutions vary in the extent to which they restrict consumer
behavior. They range from highly restrictive (e.g., prohibiting
mail-in rebates) to moderately restrictive (e.g., prohibiting
certain rebate terms) to nonrestrictive (e.g., mandating
disclosures in rebate advertisements). We discuss each
category of solutions, with a special focus on the potential
effects of nonrestrictive, disclosure-based solutions.
A. Prohibiting Mail-In Rebates
An extreme approach to addressing breakage is to
prohibit mail-in rebate offers altogether. In other words,
regulators could mandate that any price discounts must be
given at the time of purchase, or at least not be contingent on
future consumer effort. Lawmakers in Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Delaware have introduced legislation
78. Id.
79. Id. at 150.

422

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

banning mail-in rebates, although thus far, none of these bills
have become law. 80 Such legislation likely has failed to gain
support because it would have some negative consequences.
For instance, prohibiting mail-in rebates harms savvy
consumers who do save money by redeeming rebates,
interferes with consumer autonomy by limiting consumer
choice, 81 and eliminates a method of potentially efficient price
discrimination. 82
B. Mandating or Prohibiting Rebate Terms
Mandating rebate terms that increase redemption rates
and prohibiting rebate terms that decrease redemption rates
are less extreme regulatory interventions.
Redemption
processes vary depending on the rebate offeror. However,
some are quite onerous and could be streamlined to make the
process easier for consumers. 83 For example, the redemption
process would be less onerous if UPC codes, or any other
portion of the product packaging required for redemption,
were easy to find and remove and if consumers had easy
access to redemption forms throughout the redemption
period. It is difficult to mandate product packaging due to
the wide variety of products that offer rebates, but New York
and Maine have passed laws requiring easier access to
redemption forms. 84 However, existing empirical evidence on
how ease of redemption affects breakage is mixed, 85
suggesting a need for further research on the effectiveness of
interventions related to the redemption process.
One rebate feature that has been clearly demonstrated to
affect redemption rates is the length of the redemption period
(i.e., the amount of time consumers have to submit the rebate
80. H.B. 3670 (Ma. 2005) (prohibiting mail-in rebates); H.B. 167 (N.H. 2005)
(prohibiting mail-in rebates); H.B. 389 (De. 1994) (prohibiting mail-in-rebates
under $100). For a summary of rebate-related legislation, see Pechmann & Silk,
supra note 3.
81. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 5–6, 11 (arguing that paternalistic
interventions that preserve people’s freedom of choice are superior to those that
restrict choice).
82. Chen, Moorthy & Zhang, supra note 27, at 1131.
83. Pechmann & Silk, supra note 3.
84. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 1232 (2005); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 391-q
(2006).
85. Soman, supra note 44, at 430–31 & fig.1 (experiment results suggesting
that increasing required redemption effort increases breakage); Silk, supra note
26, at 32, 34 fig.6. (experiment results finding that increasing required
redemption effort decreases breakage).
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materials).
Specifically, prior studies suggest that
redemption rates decrease with longer redemption periods,
probably because consumers are more likely to procrastinate,
lose redemption materials, or forget. 86 Thus less breakage
should occur if regulations specified maximum redemption
periods. Though shorter redemption periods would likely
reduce overall breakage, some individual consumers who
would have redeemed within a longer redemption period
might be unable to redeem in a shorter redemption period.
Further, mandating short maximum redemption periods
would probably be met with resistance from both consumers
and policymakers because the idea that consumers benefit
from a shorter redemption period is counterintuitive. 87 In
fact, in a misguided effort to protect consumers, some states
have mandated minimum, rather than maximum, redemption
periods. 88
C. Mandating Rebate Disclosures
Though prohibiting mail-in rebates would eliminate
breakage and mandating less onerous rebate terms might
reduce breakage, those restrictive approaches also have
significant downsides. A less restrictive regulatory approach
to breakage is mandating disclosures in rebate offers. Several
prominent academics have argued that disclosure-based
interventions that inform consumers about actual rebate
redemption rates might improve purchase decisions without
restricting consumer choice. 89 However, others argue that a
mandatory disclosure “should be considered only if
experiments demonstrate that it will give rise to net long86. REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1 (finding that rebates with
shorter redemption deadlines exhibit higher redemption rates). See also, Silk,
supra note 26, at 31–32, 34 fig.6 (experiment finding that a 1-day redemption
deadline results in more consumers applying for their rebate than does either a
7-day or 21-day redemption deadline).
87. This idea is counterintuitive even to industry members. A survey of
PMA members found that only 2.7% believe that longer redemption periods
cause lower redemption rates. REBATE BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 1.
In addition, the survey found a “strong consensus that . . . giving consumers
more time to redeem increases redemption rates.” Id.
88. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 391-q(3) (2005) (New York law requiring
consumers to have at least 14 days after purchase to submit rebate redemption
materials); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-40 (2007) (North Carolina law requiring
consumers to have at least 30 days after purchase to submit rebate redemption
materials).
89. See supra note 4.
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term benefits.” 90 This Article reports the results of our
experiment that examines the effectiveness of a redemption
rate disclosure, as well as the effectiveness of a more direct
disclosure about overoptimism. 91 However, before discussing
these two disclosures and the reasons they might or might
not be effective, we review prior studies that have
investigated other disclosure-based solutions to breakage.
1. Prior Literature on Disclosure-Based Approaches
Most advertisements for rebated products emphasize the
product’s after-rebate price. 92 Other advertisements are more
extreme, either omitting the before-rebate price entirely or
failing to clearly state that the advertised savings is
contingent on redeeming a mail-in rebate. 93 Lawmakers in
several states have passed laws that mandate how beforeand after-rebate prices must be disclosed in advertisements.
For example, California requires advertisements to
prominently disclose the before-rebate price, the rebate
amount, and the after-rebate price, and Connecticut prohibits
advertising an after-rebate price at all. 94 No prior research
has explicitly examined the effects of California’s policy, but
research in related areas suggests that requiring firms to
emphasize the before-rebate price might backfire because this
type of disclosure highlights a high reference price that
consumers believe they will not end up paying. 95
Connecticut’s policy might be more effective. A recent study
shows that advertisements that disclose the before-rebate
price, the rebate amount, and the after-rebate price induce
more purchases than do advertisements that do not explicitly
disclose the after-rebate price. 96
Another study examined the effects of disclosures that
describe the redemption process and found that such
disclosures are somewhat effective in reducing consumers’

90. Green & Armstrong, supra note 11, at 302.
91. See infra Part III.
92. Hyeong M. Kim, Consumers’ Responses to Price Presentation Formats in
Rebate Advertisements, 82(4) J. RETAILING 309, 310 (2006).
93. Id. See also Pechmann & Silk, supra note 3.
94. Pechmann & Silk, supra note 3.
95. Id.
96. Sridar Moorthy & Dilip Soman, On the Marketing of Rebates: Having
Your Cake and Eating It Too? 20 (2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors).
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tendency to purchase rebated products. 97 Specifically, in an
experiment, consumers chose between a rebated product and
a non-rebated product, both before and after reading a
disclosure that listed five key steps in rebate redemption. 98
This redemption process disclosure caused approximately
20% of consumers who initially chose the rebated product to
change their minds and choose the non-rebated product
instead. 99
Taken together, these studies suggest that rebate-related
disclosures might be a viable method for reducing breakage.
Prohibiting after-rebate price disclosures and requiring
redemption process disclosures are likely successful
interventions because they address some of the underlying
causes of consumers’ failure to redeem rebates. For example,
the redemption process disclosure addresses consumers’
tendency to underweight future effort by getting consumers to
think carefully about future redemption effort at the time of
purchase (i.e., making the construal of the future effort less
abstract).
In our experiment, we investigate the effectiveness of two
disclosure-based solutions that attack a root cause of
breakage: consumers’ overoptimism about the likelihood of
One disclosure informs
redeeming mail-in rebates. 100
consumers about low historical redemption rates. 101 The
other disclosure is even more direct, warning that consumers
often overestimate the probability of redemption and listing
common reasons for redemption failures. 102 In the remainder
of this section, we discuss why these disclosures might or
might not be effective in reducing consumers’ overoptimism
and willingness to purchase rebated products.
2. Redemption Rate Disclosure
Mandatory
disclosure
of
redemption rates
in
advertisements for rebated products might curb consumers’
overoptimism about redemption for at least two reasons.

97. Joel B. Cohen, Julia Belyavsky & Tim Silk (2008), Using Visualization
to Alter the Balance Between Desirability and Feasibility During Choice, 18 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 270, 272–74 (2008).
98. Id. at 272.
99. Id. at 273–74.
100. See infra Part III.
101. See infra Part III.B.
102. Id.
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First, the redemption rates might be lower than consumers
presume, so this information might cause consumers to
realize that they too are unlikely to redeem. Second, even if
consumers are already aware of low redemption rates, the
disclosures might focus consumers’ attention on those rates
and provide a low anchor for consumers’ estimates of their
own probability of redemption. 103
Little research has examined the impact of disclosures
that inform consumers about average consumer behaviors.
However, a recent study in a different domain suggests these
disclosures might be effective. In that study, payday loan
borrowers were provided with a disclosure about the
surprisingly long period of time that it takes the typical
borrower to repay a payday loan. Specifically, the disclosure
stated that “[o]ut of 10 typical people taking out a new
payday loan. . . 2½ people will pay it back without renewing,
2 people will renew 1 or 2 times, 1½ people will renew 3 or 4
This
times, 4 people will renew 5 or more times.” 104
disclosure reduced the amount borrowed by 17%. 105
Though the results of that study are encouraging, the
effectiveness of redemption rate disclosures is not a foregone
conclusion. There are several reasons why redemption rate
disclosures might fail to temper consumers’ optimism. First,
consumers might fail to read the disclosures. Second, even if
consumers read them, the disclosures might fail to provide
consumers with new information. 106 Third, even if the
disclosures provide new information, consumers might believe
that information about average consumer behavior tells them
little about their own future behavior. Indeed, studies in
103. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974).
104. Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive
Biases and Payday Borrowing, 66 J. FIN 1865, 1872–73 (2011).
105. Id. at 1881–84.
106. The payday loan study found that people underestimated the average
time it takes borrowers to repay a payday loan. Id. at 1878–79. In contrast, the
movie ticket experiment described earlier suggests that consumers might
overestimate only their own likelihood of redeeming a rebate, not average
redemption rates.
There was significant overoptimism in participants’
estimates of their own probability of redemption. On average, participants who
chose the rebated tickets estimated a 94% probability that they themselves
would redeem the rebate, yet only 69% of them actually later redeemed it. Silk,
supra note 40, at 25. However, participants who chose the rebated tickets also
estimated that only 54% of participants who chose the rebate offer would
redeem the rebate, suggesting that they are already aware of low average
redemption rates. Id.

2015]

INEFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES

427

other domains find that people tend to underutilize general
base rate information
(e.g., information about typical
outcomes and behaviors) when predicting their own outcomes
and behaviors. 107
Thus far, we have outlined why redemption rate
disclosures might or might not be effective in reducing
consumers’ overoptimism and willingness to purchase rebated
products. However, prior research suggests a third possibility
as well: redemption rate disclosures could boomerang and
increase consumers’ desire to purchase rebated products. 108
Some warning disclosures, especially those issued by
authoritative sources, appear to backfire and increase the
very behaviors they are meant to discourage. For example,
studies show that warning labels can increase, rather than
decrease, drinking and driving, 109 interest in violent films and
television programs, 110 and desire to eat high-fat foods. 111
Most studies explain these boomerang effects using
Brehm’s 112 theory of psychological reactance. 113 “Reactance”
is a motivational state that occurs when a consumer feels that
his or her freedom of choice is threatened. 114 Consumers
respond negatively to perceived threats to their freedom of
choice and, as a result, can become more attracted to the
In our
threatened attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors. 115
experiment, participants might feel that the disclosure is
pressuring them to change their beliefs about the likelihood of
rebate redemption and/or the desirability of the rebated
107. Daniel Kahneman and Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts:
A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 26 (1993); Yechiel
Klar, Avita Medding & Dan Sarel, Nonunique Invulnerability: Singular versus
Distributional Probabilities and Unrealistic Optimism in Comparative Risk
Judgments, 67 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 229, 229 (1996);
Heather C. Lench & Peter H. Ditto, Automatic Optimism: Biased Use of Base
Rate Information for Positive and Negative Events, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 631, 634 (2008).
108. Stewart & Martin, supra note 9, at 3.
109. Ringold, supra note 12, at 37–39.
110. Brad J. Bushman & Angela D. Stack, Forbidden Fruit versus Tainted
Fruit: Effects of Warning Labels on Attraction to Television Violence, 2 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 207, 214–15 (1996).
111. Brad J. Bushman, Effects of Warning and Information Labels on
Consumption of Full-Fat, Reduced-Fat, and No-Fat Products, 83(1) J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 97, 99–100 (1998).
112. JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1966).
113. Ringold, supra note 12, at 42–43.
114. Mona A. Clee & Robert A. Wicklund, Consumer Behavior and
Psychological Reactance, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 389, 389 (1980).
115. Id. at 391–93.
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product. If so, the disclosure could backfire and ultimately
increase consumers’ desire to purchase the rebated product.
3. Overoptimism Disclosure
Scholars have focused on redemption rate disclosures as
a way to reduce consumers’ suboptimal purchase decisions
induced by mail-in rebates. 116 As discussed above, there is
some support for the idea that a redemption rate disclosure
will temper consumers’ optimism about the likelihood of
rebate redemption, 117 but there are also reasons to believe
that such a disclosure might be ineffective or even harmful. 118
Thus, we also test the effectiveness of a stronger disclosure
that directly informs consumers that, “people often
overestimate the probability that they will redeem a mail-in
rebate because they fail to anticipate that they will forget,
procrastinate, lose the necessary materials, or later decide it
is not worth the effort.”
The process underlying optimism is neurologicallybased, 119 which makes it particularly hard to change. 120
However, prior research in psychology suggests that one way
to combat overoptimism is to ask people to list
“counterfactuals” (i.e., reasons that that they might not be
A recent experiment demonstrates the
successful). 121
effectiveness of this technique in the rebate realm—
consumers who were asked to list reasons why they might not
redeem a mail-in rebate were significantly less likely to want
to purchase the rebated product. 122 Though it is unrealistic to
116. See supra note 4.
117. Bertrand & Morse, supra note 104, at 1881–84.
118. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 11, at 665–79; Green & Armstrong,
supra note 11, at 302; Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 11, at 429; Ringold,
supra note 12, at 51–52.
119. Tali Sharot, Alison M. Riccardi, Candace M. Raio & Elizabeth A. Phelps,
Neural Mechanisms Mediating Optimism Bias, NATURE, November 1, 2007, at
102, 103.
120. Hal R. Arkes, Cost and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for
Debiasing, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 486, 493 (1991) (doubting that warning people
about an unconscious cognitive bias would be an effective debiasing technique
because “[i]t would be difficult for subjects to abort a cognitive process that
occurs outside of their awareness.”).
121. Asher Koriat, Sarah Lichtenstein and Baruch Fischhoff, Reasons for
Confidence, 6(2) J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107,
111 (1980); Stephen J. Hoch, Counterfactual Reasoning and Accuracy in
Predicting Personal Events, 11(4) J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING,
MEMORY, & COGNITION 719, 725 (1985).
122. Gourville & Soman, supra note 76, at 149.
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mandate that consumers write such a list prior to purchasing
a rebated product, lawmakers could mandate disclosures that
provide counterfactuals to consumers. Thus, our study tests
the effectiveness of a stronger disclosure listing the reasons
consumers fail to redeem rebates.
Although this disclosure relies on a mechanism that has
successfully reduced overoptimism in other domains, it
suffers from some of the same limitations as disclosing
redemption rates: consumers may fail to read the disclosure,
and, even if they do read it, they may believe that the reasons
other consumers fail to redeem rebates do not apply to
themselves. In other words, consumers may be overly
optimistic about whether they are overly optimistic. Further,
like the redemption rate disclosure, this disclosure could
result in psychological reactance and a resulting increase in
consumers’ desire to purchase the rebated product. In fact, to
the extent that consumers perceive the overoptimism
disclosure as a warning, rather than an informational
disclosure, this disclosure might be even more likely to
backfire than is the redemption rate disclosure. 123
In summary, prior studies suggest that redemption rate
and overoptimism disclosures could decrease, increase, or
have no effect on consumers’ overoptimism and willingness to
purchase rebated products. This uncertainty regarding the
benefits of such disclosures indicates that empirical evidence
on their effectiveness is necessary. 124 In the following section,
we describe our experiment, which provides such evidence.
III.

THE EXPERIMENT: TESTING REBATE DISCLOSURES

A. Participants
Five hundred forty-nine U.S. citizens recruited by Toluna
USA, a market research firm, participated in the
experiment. 125 Participants appeared to be familiar with and
influenced by rebate offers. Eighty-two percent of them
reported having previously seen an advertisement for a
product offering a mail-in rebate. Ninety-one percent had
purchased a product offering a mail-in rebate before, and 73%
of those stated that a rebate offer influenced their most recent
123. Bushman & Stack, supra note 110, at 223.
124. Green & Armstrong, supra note 11, at 302.
125. TOLUNA, http://www.toluna-group.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
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purchase of a rebated product.
Demographic information for the study participants, as
well as comparison data for the general U.S. adult population,
is provided in Table 1. The table shows that the participants
are a diverse group, ranging in age from 18–88, with a variety
of racial/ethnic backgrounds and education and income levels.
Our participants are fairly representative of the general U.S.
population, although the sample includes a higher proportion
of females, a lower proportion of racial/ethnic minorities, a
slightly lower median household income, and is slightly older
and better educated than the general population.

TABLE 1
Demographic Data on Experimental Participants
Experimental
Participants

U.S. Adult
Populationa

Gender
Male
Female

34%
66%

48%
52%

Age
18 to 39 years old
40 to 59 years old
60 to 79 years old
80 or older

27%
47%
25%
1%

37%
38%
20%
5%

9%

12%

4%
81%
4%
1%
1%

5%
65%
16%
< 1%
1-2%

2%
24%
30%
28%
5%

13%
31%
17%
28%
n/a

Race/Ethnicity
African American (NonHispanic)
Asian
White (Non-Hispanic)
Hispanic or Latino
Native American
Other
Highest Education Level
Achieved
No high school degree
High school degree
Some college
College degree
Some graduate school

2015]

431

INEFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES

Graduate degree
Household Income
Less than $25,000
Between $25,000 and
$49,999
Between $50,000 and
$74,999
Between $75,000 and
$99,999
$100,000 or more
Prefer not to answer

11%

11%

23%
32%

25%
25%

19%

18%

8%

12%

10%
8%

20%
n/a

a

Data for U.S. Adult Population from the U.S. Census website
(http://www.census.gov/). Gender, age, and race/ethnicity are based on 2010
census data, and education level and household income are based on 2009
census data. We were not able to find race/ethnicity data stratified by age, so
the data for race/ethnicity includes children as well as adults. U.S. population
growth is lower for White (Non-Hispanic) than for some other racial categories,
so eliminating children would likely result in a higher percentage of people in
the White (Non-Hispanic) category.

A logistic regression with the five demographic variables
as independent variables and product choice as the dependent
variable finds that only Race/Ethnicity is a significant
predictor of participants’ product choice (χ2 = 5.32, p = 0.02).
When we run a full-factorial logistic regression with the
Race/Ethnicity variable and our two manipulated variables
(the rebate disclosures) as independent variables and product
choice as the dependent variable, we find that Race/Ethnicity
does not interact with either of our manipulated variables (all
p > 0.10). This suggests that, although Race/Ethnicity affects
the general propensity to choose the rebated product (perhaps
due to different brand loyalties), it does not affect how
participants respond to rebate disclosures.
B. Experimental Design and Procedures
Toluna USA administered the experiment online and
compensated participants with points that could later be
converted into prizes. Participants began by viewing an
advertisement for two portable DVD players: a Panasonic
DVD player and a Sony DVD player (see Figure 1). 126 The
126. To prevent order effects, we randomized the order that the two DVD
players appeared in the advertisement and the order of the response
possibilities for the choice dependent measure.
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Panasonic DVD player was priced at $169.99. The Sony was
priced at $179.99 with a $40 mail-in rebate, for an afterrebate price of $139.99. We wanted most participants to
prefer the Panasonic in the absence of a mail-in rebate offer
on the Sony; this allowed the rebate to induce an increase in
the percentage of people who chose the Sony. Consequently,
we set the product features so that the Panasonic DVD player
was slightly better than the Sony (e.g., 8-hour battery for the
Panasonic versus 7-hour battery for the Sony).

FIGURE 1
Sample Advertisements from Experimental Materials
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After reviewing the advertisement, participants indicated
which DVD player they would be more likely to purchase.
Participants also answered two questions that capture their
optimism about rebate redemption. Specifically, we follow
Weinstein’s seminal paper, which measured optimism as the
difference between a person’s perceptions of their own and
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others’ chances of experiencing an event. 127 We therefore
asked participants to assess: (a) the probability that they
themselves would redeem the rebate and (b) the probability
that others who purchased the rebated product would redeem
the rebate. Finally, participants answered a number of
demographic and manipulation check questions.
1. Experimental Conditions
The experiment has a 2 × 2 design: we manipulated
whether consumers received a Redemption Rate Disclosure
(Yes, No) and an Overoptimism Disclosure (Yes, No). In other
words, there were four experimental conditions.
The
advertisement in the Yes Redemption Rate Disclosure/No
Overoptimism Disclosure condition contained only the
redemption rate disclosure. The advertisement in the No
Redemption Rate Disclosure/Yes Overoptimism Disclosure
condition contained only the overoptimism disclosure. The
advertisement in the Yes Redemption Rate Disclosure/Yes
Overoptimism
Disclosure
condition
contained
both
disclosures, and the advertisement in the No Redemption
Rate Disclosure/No Overoptimism Disclosure condition
contained neither disclosure.
In the Yes Redemption Rate Disclosure conditions, the
advertisement contained a disclosure stating, “[o]ur sales
records show rebate redemption rates of approximately 30%
for rebates of this type and size.” We chose a 30% redemption
rate because it should be low enough to reduce rebate-induced
purchases if participants believe the 30% base rate applies to
them 128 and it is high enough to be believable. 129
Advertisements in the Yes Overoptimism Disclosure
conditions contained the disclosure “[s]tudies show that people
often overestimate the probability that they will redeem a
mail-in rebate because they fail to anticipate that they will
127. Weinstein, supra note 69, at 809.
128. For participants who believed that they had only a 30% chance of
redeeming the rebate, the expected cost of the rebated Sony DVD player to them
would be $167.99 (i.e., the $179.99 before-rebate price minus 30% multiplied by
the $40 rebate). Because the Panasonic DVD player has slightly better
features, costs almost the same ($169.99), and doesn’t require redeeming a
rebate, we anticipated that most such participants would buy the Panasonic
instead.
129. Silk & Janiszewski, supra note 2, at 5 (promotion managers report
rebate redemption rates of about 40% on consumer electronics and between
10%–30% on $10–$20 rebates on $100 software).
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forget, procrastinate, lose the necessary materials, or later
decide it is not worth the effort.”
2. Control Conditions
In addition to the four experimental conditions, there
were three control conditions. In the Full Price control
condition, the Sony DVD player did not offer a rebate; it
merely had a price of $179.99. Because the Panasonic had
slightly better features and a price of $169.99, we expected
most participants in the Full Price condition to prefer the
Panasonic. Indeed, only 25% of participants in the Full Price
condition chose the Sony DVD player over the Panasonic.
This number provides an important baseline: if more than
25% of participants chose the Sony in any of the four rebate
conditions, this suggests that the rebate offer influenced
product choice in that condition.
In the second control condition, the Sale Price condition,
the Sony product offered an instant savings of $40 (i.e., a
sale), rather than a $40 mail-in rebate. We expected more
participants to prefer the Sony in this condition because,
although the Panasonic had slightly better features, the onsale Sony was $30 cheaper than the Panasonic. Indeed, 65%
of participants in the Sale Price condition chose the Sony.
This condition also provides an important baseline. Sixty-five
percent of consumers chose the Sony when no effort was
required to get the $40 savings, so if fewer than 65% of
participants in any of the rebate conditions choose the Sony,
this suggests that the effort associated with rebate
redemption influenced consumers’ purchase decisions.
The experiment also included one final control condition.
If rebate disclosures are ineffective, it is important to know if
this is because participants fail to read the disclosures or
because they deem the disclosures irrelevant. Thus, the
experiment also included a condition where the Sony DVD
player offered a rebate, but instead of one of the rebate
disclosures, the advertisement contained a non-rebate
disclosure that we expected to play a role in consumers’
product choice: “This DVD player has been refurbished by the
manufacturer to like-new condition.”
This Refurbished
Disclosure had the identical font size, color, and location as
the rebate disclosures in the other experimental conditions.
If participants did not respond to any of the disclosures,
including the Refurbished Disclosure, this would suggest that

436

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

participants tend to ignore disclosures at the bottom of
advertisements. However, if participants ignored the rebate
disclosures but responded negatively to the Refurbished
Disclosure, this would suggest that they notice the rebate
disclosures but deem them irrelevant.
C. Results
Panel A of Figure 2 displays the percentage of
participants who chose the rebated product in each
experimental condition. As the figure shows, neither the
Redemption Rate Disclosure nor the Overoptimism Disclosure
reduced the proportion of consumers who chose the rebated
product. Indeed, the disclosures appear to have had the
opposite effect.
Forty-six percent of experimental
participants who received neither disclosure chose the
rebated Sony DVD player, compared with 55% who received
the Redemption Rate Disclosure, 59% who received the
Overoptimism Disclosure, and 72% who received both
disclosures. 130 Panel A of Table 2 reports the results of a
logistic regression that formally tests whether these
differences are statistically significant.
This analysis
confirms that both disclosures significantly increased
participants’ willingness to purchase the rebated product
(Redemption Rate Disclosure: χ2 = 3.94, p = 0.05;
Overoptimism Disclosure: χ2 = 7.95, p < 0.01).
We next compare the percentage of people who chose the
rebated product in the experimental conditions with those in
the control conditions. Comparisons with the Full Price
control condition, where the Sony DVD player did not have
any sales promotion, suggest that the rebate offer increased
the product’s attractiveness to consumers. Only 25% of
consumers in the Full Price condition chose the Sony DVD
player, compared to 46% to 72% in the experimental
conditions where the Sony DVD player had a $40 rebate offer
(all p ≤ 0.01).
Comparisons with the Sale Price condition, where the
Sony offered a $40 instant savings instead of a rebate,
suggest that consumers are somewhat sensitive to future
redemption effort at the time of purchase, but only in the
absence of rebate disclosures.
Specifically, 65% of
130. Results of a smaller pilot test on 76 undergraduate students showed a
similar pattern of results.
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participants in the Sale Price condition choose the Sony,
compared to 46% in the experimental condition where
consumers received no rebate disclosures (Z = 2.47, p = 0.01).
However, in the three experimental conditions where
consumers viewed rebate disclosures, consumers were not
significantly less likely to purchase the Sony DVD player
when the $40 saving was in the form of a rebate rather than
an instant savings (all p > 0.10). Thus, any sensitivity
consumers have to future redemption effort at the time of
purchase appears to be largely offset by the negative
boomerang effect of the rebate disclosures.
TABLE 2
Regression Results
Panel A: Logistic Regression Results for Choice
Dependent Measure
Redemption Rate Disclosure
Overoptimism Disclosure
Redemption Rate Disclosure ×
Overopt. Disclosure

df

β

Wald 2χ

1
1
1

0.46
0.66
0.19

3.94
7.95
0.17

pvalue
0.05
< 0.01
0.68

Panel B: ANOVA Results for Optimism Dependent
Measure
Redemption Rate Disclosure
Overoptimism Disclosure
Redemption Rate Disclosure ×
Overopt. Disclosure

df

MSE

1
1
1

9,706.59
635.90
1894.24

FStatistic
11.60
0.76
2.26

pvalue
< 0.01
0.38
0.13

Panel A of Table 2 reports logistic regression results with the percentage of
participants who chose the rebated product as the dependent variable and the
presence of the Redemption Rate and Overoptimism Disclosures as categorical
independent variables. Panel B reports ANOVA results with participants’
Optimism scores as the dependent variable and the presence of the Redemption
Rate and Overoptimism Disclosures as independent variables. The Optimism
measure was calculated by subtracting each participant’s assessment of the
probability that others would redeem the rebate from the participant’s
assessment of the probability that they themselves would redeem the rebate.

FIGURE 2

438

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

Effects of Rebate Disclosure on Product Choice and
Optimism

Our experiment measures participants’ assessments of
their willingness to purchase products rather than their
actual purchase decisions. As such, it is possible that
participants did not focus on the experiment and that the
rebate disclosures’ ineffectiveness is a result of this.
However, the fact that the disclosures cause a boomerang
effect, rather than no effect, helps rule out this possibility. If
participants were not paying attention, the disclosures would
have had no effect on their choices. As further evidence,
participants responded very negatively to a disclosure with
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identical formatting and placement that disclosed that the
rebated product was refurbished. Specifically, only 21% of
participants in the Refurbished Disclosure control condition
chose the Sony player. This result suggests that the absence
of similar negative reactions to the rebate disclosures is likely
not due to a lack of care or an unwillingness to read
disclosures at the bottom of advertisements.
Our theory suggests that breakage results from
consumers’ overoptimism about future rebate redemption, so
we also examine the effects of the rebate disclosures on
participants’ optimism. We capture participants’ optimism by
asking them to assess the probability that other consumers
who purchased the Sony would redeem the rebate and the
probability that they themselves would redeem the rebate if
they were to purchase the Sony. We then compute a measure
of each participant’s optimism by subtracting their assessed
probability of others’ redemptions from their assessed
probability of their own redemption. Panel B of Figure 2
reports the level of optimism across conditions and shows
that the rebate disclosures actually increase, rather than
decrease, consumer optimism. Specifically, we observe an
optimism score of 23% for participants who viewed neither
disclosure, 31% for participants who viewed only the
Overoptimism Disclosure, 39% for participants who viewed
only the Redemption Rate Disclosure, and 37% for
participants who viewed both disclosures. An ANOVA, which
tests whether these differences are statistically significant,
(see Panel B of Table 2) shows that the increase in optimism
for those who viewed the Redemption Rate Disclosure is
statistically significant (F = 11.60, p < 0.01) but the increase
for those who viewed the Overoptimism Disclosure is not (F =
0.76, p > 0.10). Given these effects on consumer optimism, it
is unsurprising that the disclosures increased, rather than
decreased, the percentage of consumers who chose the
rebated product.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSION

Lawmakers and academics often propose mandatory
disclosures as the primary method of consumer protection. 131
Mandatory disclosures are popular because they are generally

131. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 11, at 652, 681–84.
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considered to be the cheapest and easiest-to-implement fix. 132
Further, many lawmakers mistakenly believe that even if
disclosure-based solutions do not help, they cannot hurt. 133
That is, unlike other regulatory approaches, mandatory
disclosures do not restrict consumer behavior because
consumers are free to ignore the disclosures. Consequently,
many lawmakers assume that such disclosures will have
either, (a) a positive effect, if consumers are influenced by the
disclosures, or (b) no effect, if consumers are not influenced by
the disclosures. Our results provide support for a third
alternative–that disclosures can harm consumers–and
highlight the potential danger of using mandatory disclosures
to improve consumer decision-making.
We examined the effects of two rebate disclosures on the
optimism and rebate-related purchase decisions of a large,
diverse set of consumers. One disclosure informed consumers
about low rebate redemption rates and the other informed
consumers about their overoptimism. We found that the both
disclosures were not only ineffective, they were harmful: the
disclosures generally increased, rather than decreased,
consumer optimism and the percentage of consumers who
chose the rebated product.
Our study is not the first to demonstrate these types of
boomerang effects in response to mandatory disclosures.
Prior research suggests that warning disclosures, especially
those issued by authoritative sources, sometimes increase
undesirable behaviors. 134 Brehm’s reactance theory 135 is the
If
most common explanation for boomerang effects. 136
consumers who are warned not to engage in a behavior
believe that their freedom of choice is being threatened,
reactance theory predicts that they will respond by becoming
more attracted to the threatened alternative. 137 In our rebate
setting, it is perhaps less surprising that the Overoptimism
Disclosure, which explicitly warned consumers about the
reasons people fail to redeem rebates, caused reactance.
However, our Redemption Rate Disclosure was much subtler,
132. Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein, & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on
Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 3 (2005)
133. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 11, at 682.
134. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
135. Brehm, supra note 112.
136. Ringold, supra note 12, at 42–43.
137. Clee & Wicklund, supra note 114, at 391–93.
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simply informing consumers about low redemption rates.
Despite this, consumers responded almost as negatively to
the implicit warning contained in the Redemption Rate
Disclosure as they did to the more heavy-handed
Overoptimism Disclosure.
Regardless of the reason for the disclosures’ perverse
effects on consumers’ purchase decisions, one thing is clear:
these types of disclosures are not a viable solution for
policymakers trying to curb consumers’ overoptimism about
rebate redemption.
Further, our results highlight the
importance of empirical study of any proposed disclosure
before implementation. Prior to our study, there were good
reasons to believe that redemption rate disclosures might be
an effective way to reduce breakage, and, as such, these
disclosures were an oft-proposed solution. Rebate disclosures
are likely not the only regulatory solution with subtle
unanticipated
negative
effects,
making
empirical
investigation critical.

